Geography, Institutions and Human Development: A Cross-Country Investigation Using Bayesian Model Averaging by Malik, Sadia Mariam & Janjua, Yasin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Geography, Institutions and Human
Development: A Cross-Country
Investigation Using Bayesian Model
Averaging
Sadia Mariam Malik and Yasin Janjua
Centre for Research on Economic and Social Transformation
(CREST)
18. March 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24612/
MPRA Paper No. 24612, posted 19. September 2010 15:47 UTC
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1574396
1 
 
Geography, Institutions and Human Development: A Cross-Country Analysis using 
Bayesian Model Averaging 
 
 
Sadia Mariam Malik 
& 
M. Yasin Janjua 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the role of long standing institutions – identified through geography, 
disease ecology, colonial legacy, and some direct measures of political and economic 
governance – on human development and its non income components across countries. The 
study employs a novel econometric technique called the Bayesian Model Averaging that allows 
us to select the relevant predictors by experimenting with a host of competing sets of variables. 
It constructs estimates as weighted average of OLS estimates for every possible combination of 
included variables. This is particularly useful in situations when there is model uncertainty and 
theory provides only a weak guidance on the selection of appropriate predictors. Of the 25 
variables that we tried, three stand out in terms of their degree of importance and their 
robustness across various specifications. These include malaria ecology, KKZ index of good 
governance and fertility rate. Our finding on the dominant and robust role of malaria ecology in 
explaining differences in human development across countries, even in the presence of 
variables that directly and indirectly measure the quality of institutions, is extremely 
fascinating. It shows that malaria ecology has a direct negative impact on human development 
and this effect appears to be over and above its effect via institutions.  Some of the other 
measures of climate and geography as well as those of colonial legacy are important as long as 
we do not control for some direct measures of the performance of political and economic 
institutions such as the KKZ index of good governance and democracy score. Once we control 
for these and other conditioning variables such as public spending on health and education; 
fertility rates; and measures of health infrastructure, the importance of geography and colonial 
legacy disappears.        
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1. Motivation and objectives of the study 
The central motivation of this study is based upon the insights developed from an in-depth 
analysis of the issues and challenges involved in human development in South Asia. In the 
aftermath of trade and market liberalization in the early 1990s, most countries in the South 
Asian region registered unprecedented rates of economic growth that exceeded 9 percent in 
India; 7 percent in Pakistan; 6 percent in Bangladesh and Bhutan; and 5 percent in Bangladesh. 
The benefits of such an impressive economic growth however, do not seem to have translated 
into concomitant improvements in human development indicators. The region continues to host 
the largest number of poor, illiterate and the malnourished people in the world (see e.g. 
Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 2007).  
Although, poverty rates in all South Asian countries have declined, yet the rate of 
reduction in poverty have not matched that of economic growth. In fact, absolute poverty 
defined in terms of the number of poor, has merely registered 2 percent reduction, on average, 
per annum (from 527 million in 1993 to 423 million in 2004). In spite of overall declines in 
headcount poverty, the global share of South Asia in the total number of poor has increased 
from 40 percent in 1993 to 47 percent in 2004. Its share in the total number of illiterate adults in 
the world has also gone up from 46 to 49 percent during the same period. The enrolment rates 
have improved over the years, yet two countries in the region, India and Pakistan, continue to 
put up with the highest numbers of out of school children in the world. Malnutrition, 
particularly among children continues to be a serious problem with nearly one half of the 
children under the age of five estimated to be below their weight for age. 
This lackluster performance of South Asia in terms of human development in the presence 
of high economic growth strengthens the view that the benefits of economic growth have been 
unevenly distributed across regions and across various socioeconomic groups within countries. 
The gains have largely been captured by relatively small, educated, urban based elite with the 
result that income inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient went up in almost all South 
Asian countries between 1990 and 1995 (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 2007). 
This scenario gives rise to the following critical question:  If the gains of economic growth are 
not automatically translated into adequate improvements in human development, what are the 
factors that ensure they do?  
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Intuitively, this takes us to the centrality of the role of institutions and the structure of 
political, economic and civic governance in explaining human development. If Amartya Sen 
(see e.g. Sen 2000) defines human development as the enlargement of choices and opportunities 
available to people and an expansion of their capabilities and freedom, then the achievement of 
this broader goal is hard to envisage without putting people at the centre. Institutions that lack 
transparency, accountability and freedom of speech, and that are weak in terms of enforcing 
property rights and contracts, are bound to promote the interests of a few powerful groups at 
the expense of others. In this sense, low investment in human development, poor social security 
arrangements, fiscal mismanagement and corruption; as well as uneven development and social 
exclusion are all symptoms of a much deeper malaise – succinctly described as the poor quality 
of institutions.   
Most countries of South Asia as well as those in Middle East, and Sub Saharan Africa 
were formerly British, Portuguese, French colonies. The colonial rule left deep imprints on the 
culture as well as the formal and informal values, social norms, rules and regulations. The 
institutions developed by the colonists were largely meant to exploit the local subjects in order 
to promote the colonial interests. As countries gained independence from colonial rule, the key 
features of these institutions remained intact with the replacement of colonists by local elites. 
The exploitative features of these institutions facilitated these local elites to deny masses their 
rights and continue a culture of political patronage. In the case of South Asia for instance, 
political and economic power continues to be concentrated amongst a handful of elite groups. 
Dynastic politics and feudalism still thrive even in the presence of democracy, whereas ethnic 
and religious differences continue to be exploited leading to violence and social exclusion.  
 One may argue however, that not all countries that were former colonies have 
performed badly. Countries of Middle East, for instance are comparatively better ranked in 
some areas of human development than their neighboring countries in South Asia and Africa. 
Likewise, some of the highly developed countries such as the U.S.A and Australia were former 
colonies as well. The issue therefore may not be of whether or not a country has been a former 
colony, but whether the institutions developed in the past were exploitative or long lasting. In 
other words, the central question of our interest could be the type and the quality of institutions 
inherited from colonial rulers.  
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The question that arises then is how to measure the quality of institutions across 
countries. Recent empirical literature has used geographical variables that determine the disease 
environment to indicate the quality of institutions (see e.g. Easterly and Levine 2003). The 
central argument of this stream of literature is that the colonization strategy that the Europeans 
adopted in various countries depended upon the ecological conditions of the region. Countries 
that were located in temperate zones, and away from the equator were less prone to infectious 
diseases and had lower mortality rates. In these countries, Europeans preferred to settle and 
create better and long-lasting institutions that emphasized the protection of property rights and 
a system of checks and balances that are crucial in the effective functioning of governments. On 
the other hand, in countries where the settlers mortality was higher, Europeans did not settle 
but instead created „extractive‟ institutions that promoted political and economic power (see 
Acemoglou et. al. 2001 (AJR) for more details). The key assumption behind using these 
historical factors to identify the present day quality of institutions is that the type and quality of 
institutions are persistent and that history and initial conditions have an important role to play 
in shaping the path of development that a country may take.   
In recent years, a number of interesting studies have been conducted to investigate the 
impact of these long standing institutions – identified through geography and colonial legacy - 
on economic growth (see e.g. Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001). These studies employ 
a vast array of variables that capture geography (such as soil quality; distance from equator; 
latitude; and longitude), climatic conditions (such as temperate versus tropical location; and 
mean temperature) disease ecology (such as malaria ecology); and colonial legacy (such as 
whether or not the country has been colonized, the identity of colonizer: French or British, and 
the fraction of the people speaking any of the European languages). 
However, no such study is conducted to investigate the impact of these institutions on a 
broader and a much more relevant indicator of human wellbeing such as the human 
development. A few studies that have been conducted on the role of institutions and human 
development (see next section for a comprehensive review) have mostly looked at the 
symptomatic variables - such as the absence or presence of democracy, civil and political 
liberties, government effectiveness, quality of governance, and corruption etc – and not on the 
structural and deeper parameters – such as colonial history and geographic variables – that 
determine the path of subsequent political, civil and economic institutions.  
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The present study uses advanced econometric techniques and a broad range of variables 
that are available to access geographical and ecological conditions; disease environment; and 
colonial history, to investigate the role of deep and structural factors - that are relatively 
predetermined and that define the broad contours of the type and quality of institutions – in 
human development across countries. In particular, we are interested in answering the 
following questions: 
1. Does the quality of long standing institutions - as identified by colonial history, 
geography, climate, and disease ecology - matter for human development across 
countries? 
2. Do geography, climate, and disease ecology have a direct impact on human 
development or does this effect merely run via institutions? A number of studies 
have found no direct impact of disease ecology and geographical location on 
economic development once institutions are controlled for (see e.g. Easterly and 
Levine 2002; and Acemoglu and Johnson et al. 2001). Is this true for a broader 
measure of development such as the human development? 
The next section (section 2) presents a comprehensive review of literature. Section 3 discusses 
the sample and the selection of variables employed in the study. Section 4 presents some 
estimation preliminaries and some broad patterns emerging from the data. Section 5 outlines 
the econometric methodology employed and its relevance in providing answers to our research 
questions. Section 6 presents the estimation results and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Review of Literature 
Institutions as defined by Douglass North (North, 1990) are humanly devised constraints 
that structure human interaction. They include formal institutions such as rules and regulations; 
as well as informal ones such as culture, mentalities, habits, trust, norms, conventions, codes 
and networks. Informal institutions are hard to capture although researchers have recently 
attempted to capture some of these aspects under the broad category of “social capital” or 
“social institutions”. For the purposes of present study, our focus is on formal institutions that 
primarily fall under the broad categories of economic and political institutions. Economic 
institutions include, but may not be limited to the following: rule of law; property rights; 
contract enforcement; regulation of market externalities; fair competition; transparency; 
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accountability; macroeconomic stability that includes fiscal discipline, efficient taxation system 
and low inflation etc); and efficient delivery of public services that includes social welfare; social 
protection; education; health; social infrastructure. Political institutions, in general, encompass 
the type of political regime (such as democracy vs. authoritarianism); political stability and the 
absence of violence; constitutional structures (federalist vs. unitary state); and state capacities 
that include technical as well as administrative capacity of the state. Political institutions are 
complementary to the economic institutions and both are mutually reinforcing. 
The indicators classified above under the broad categories of economic and political 
institutions are however performance indicators that capture certain aspects of an institutional 
system. Although these indicators have been used widely in cross section empirical studies 
particularly on economic growth, economists have come to realize the endogeneity of these 
indicators thereby limiting the precision and reliability of the econometric results (see e.g 
Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin, 2000). The idea is that indicators such as corruption and 
bad bureaucracy could very well be the response of poor economic performance. The same 
could very well be true for human development where political instability, violence, corruption, 
and bad bureaucracy may very well be the outcomes of low human development.  The general 
idea of the whole story is that we need a much deeper, structural and a relatively pre-
determined measure of the quality of institutions. Recently economists have used indicators of 
geography, climate, disease environment and colonial history to identify the quality of long 
standing institutions.   
2.1 From geography to institutions: key theoretical arguments and empirical studies 
As elaborated in section 1 above, geography, ecology, disease environment and colonial history 
have been used in the literature to identify the quality of long standing institutions. The 
advantage of using these variables as indirect measures of institutional quality is that they are 
predetermined and are more structural and deep in nature than some of the direct measures of 
political and economic institutions such as the democracy and governance indicators. The 
following are the key variables that are used as „deep‟ measures of the quality of institutions:  
2.1.1 Settler Mortality 
This variable is measured by the logarithm of annualized deaths per thousand European 
soldiers during the early 19th century for 72 former colonies. The basic argument behind using 
this variable as a proxy for the quality of long standing institutions is that in regions where 
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settler mortality was high, Europeans did not settle and instead created „extractive‟ institutions 
whereas in countries where settler mortality was low, they settled and created „long-lasting‟ 
institutions. The key assumption behind this view is that European colonists adopted different 
colonization strategies that determined the quality of institutions that persisted even in the post 
independence period (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (AJR), 2001). AJR (2001) argued 
that post colonial governments of settler colonists were more democratic and defended 
property rights and rule of law, as compared to colonies where Europeans did not settle. 
Using these measures of longstanding institutions, a number of empirical studies have 
found a significant and a robust role of institutions on the level and growth of per capita GDP 
across countries (see e.g. Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly 2005; Easterly and Levine, 2003 and 
Acemoglu and Johnson et al., 2003). The data on this measure is however limited and studies 
that use several controls such as the present one, the sample size gets too small for any 
meaningful results 
2.1.2 Tropical versus temperate climatic zones 
Tropical vs. temperate geographic locations are found to affect development both directly as 
well as indirectly through institutions. According to Sachs (2000), of the thirty economies 
classified by the World Bank as high income, only two: Singapore and Hong Kong - that 
together contribute merely one percent of the population of rich economies - lie in the tropical 
regions. The direct impact of tropical climate on income runs through a number of channels that 
include low productivity of tropical soils; high prevalence of crop pests and parasites; lack of 
applicability of ecologically specific technologies developed in the temperate regions in the 
tropics; and favorable conditions for infectious diseases (see e.g. Diamond 1997). Tropical 
climate is also used as an indirect measure of the quality of institutions due to the same 
argument described above that tropical locations have historically been prone to infectious 
diseases leading to high mortality rates discouraging the European colonists to settle and create 
long lasting institutions. By this argument, tropical regions, in general, have poor quality of 
institutions compared to those of temperate regions 
2.1.3 Land endowments 
This hypothesis, attributed to Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), states that the long run path of 
institutional and economic development is greatly determined by the initial conditions or factor 
endowments. Countries with land endowment that is favorable to the production of those crops 
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- that require economies of scale and the use of slave labor - are historically characterized by the 
concentration of power among the population and landed elites. On the other hand countries 
with the endowment of land favorable to the production of crops such as wheat that can be 
produced by a family farm and does not require economies of scale, are associated with the 
growth of a large middle class in which power is distributed more widely. Sokoloff and 
Angerman (2000) argue that the resulting inequality due to differences in these endowments 
has led to the persistence of inequality since elites in these societies developed legal frameworks 
and rules that strengthened their power and resisted wider distribution and social and 
economic power. Easterly and Levine (2005) use agricultural endowments in the form of 
abundance of land for growing wheat relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane to predict 
inequality and long-term economic development. Using this pre-determined measure of 
inequality, Easterly and Levine (2005) find “inequality to be a large and statistically significant 
barrier to prosperity, good quality institutions and high schooling.” 
2.1.4 Disease ecology 
Due to the availability of improved data on disease ecology particularly malaria, there has been 
a renewed interest in investigating the impact of malaria ecology on economic development. 
Jeffrey Sachs of the Earth Institute, Colombia is a prominent advocate of the direct role of 
malaria in economic development (see e.g. Sachs 2003). He argues that 41 out of the 44 countries 
with severe malaria lie in the bottom half of global ranking of countries with respect to GDP per 
capita. Economic growth in these countries has been dismal. Sachs argues that countries that 
have been able to eradicate malaria in past century have been able to grow much faster than 
growth in their region.  He identifies a number of channels through which the prevalence of 
malaria has a direct effect on economic development. These include reduction in workers‟ 
productivity; increase in absenteeism both among teachers and students; premature mortality 
and increase in medical costs. According to Sachs, malaria consumes up to 25 percent of 
household income and 40 percent of the government health spending in Africa. 
Acemoglu and Johnson et al. (2003), on the other hand argue that disease ecology do not 
have a direct effect on economic development. The only effect that they may have is through 
institutions.  Long lasting institutions that protect property rights and are favorable to economic 
and social development are developed by colonists in those regions that had favorable disease 
ecology with low settler mortality. On the other hand, regions where disease ecology was prone 
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to malaria and yellow fever was fatal for European and in these regions, Europeans developed 
„extractive‟ institutions resulting in the concentration of political and economic power.  
Acemoglu and Johnson et al. (2003) argue that some studies that explore the direct role of 
malaria have an omitted variable bias because malaria prevalence is correlated with European 
settlement and colonization strategies.  
2.2 Institutions and Human Development: Empirical Studies 
As mentioned in section 1 above, we do not find any study that looks at the role of any of the 
structural and deep measures of the quality of institutions on human development. 
Interestingly, we came across quite a few studies that examined the impact of democracy on 
child mortality rates and a few studies that primarily examined the impact of corruption and 
bad governance on some selected indicators such as child mortality, drop-out rates and public 
expenditure on health and education. These studies are briefly reviewed below:   
2.2.1  Political institutions and human development  
Political institutions have an instrumental significance in the formulation and implementation 
of public policies pertaining to the distribution of resources and the provision of public services 
such as health and education. Sen (2000), for instance, argues that participatory democracy that 
encourages public debate and discussion as well as civil and political rights has a constructive 
role in both the formation of values, norms and preferences as well as their translation into 
policies that benefit the society. 
A number of cross country empirical studies have examined the role of political institutions 
in human development or its non income components (particularly infant and child mortality). 
Majority of these studies have looked at the type of political regime as a measure of the political 
institutions. Volmer and Ziegler (2009) for instance conducted a panel analysis corresponding to 
1970-2003 and examined the relationship between democracy and the non income components 
of human development and found that democracy has a positive impact on life expectancy and 
literacy rates even after controlling for GDP. Several  other empirical studies, mostly in the 
realm of political science, have found a significant positive effect -  that is independent of the 
level of development  - on  child health outcomes (see e.g. Zweifel and Navia, 2000; Przeworski 
et al ,2000; Lake and Baum, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, 2004; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; 
Franco and Ruiz, 2004; Tsai 2006; Ross, 2006).  
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A number of convincing arguments have been made in the literature regarding the 
mechanisms through which democracy is expected to promote greater human development. 
First, it is argued that in democracies the median voter is the decisive voter and in unequal 
societies, the income of the median voter is way below the mean income. The median voter 
collectively forces the government to redistribute income in favor of the poor (see e.g. 
Volmer and Ziegler, 2009). It is therefore argued that democracy tends to improve the 
distribution of a country‟s resources (see Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Boix, 2003; Mulligan 
and Sala-i-Martin. 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;) and thereby fosters the wellbeing of 
the great majority of the population. Second, it is argued that since democracies are 
accountable to the people for their political survival, they have a greater tendency to 
address to the needs of the poor and to provide them with a wide array of opportunities. 
They promote higher manufacturing wages (Rodrik 1999), higher investment in human 
capital (Baum and Lake 2003; Stasavage 2005; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Avelino and 
Hunter 2005), and a higher social welfare (Dasgupta 1993). Amartya Sen‟s famous 
contention that famines rarely occur in democracies (Sen 2000), is itself a convincing 
argument for the instrumental role of democracy in human development.  
Despite these theoretical arguments and the plethora of empirical studies establishing a 
positive relationship between democracy and child mortality, there is still a lack of 
consensus on this issue. Ross (2006) for instance is highly critical of the studies that establish 
a positive link between democracy and child health outcomes. He argues that most of these 
studies do not control for country specific factors. There could be a possibility of some third 
factor that drives both the reduction in infant mortality and the greater prevalence of 
democracy. He argues further that reduction in mortality rates over time, due to 
technological advancements in public health, almost coincides with a dramatic rise in the 
prevalence of democracy. So there could be an „exogenous health trend‟ that the existing 
studies fail to take into account.  Ross (2006) also argues that most of these cross section 
studies suffer from selection bias as the majority of countries that have dictatorships may 
not have the required data. The study further contends that the poor on average may not be 
concerned about civil and political rights if it does not improve their material wellbeing. 
Democracies are not immune to elite capture of public resources. They may promote 
inequitable distribution of public resources whereby the benefits of public expenditure on 
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public services are captured more by the upper income groups than the lower income 
groups. 
The subject of the link between democracy and human development therefore is still 
open for further work. Some of the limitations of earlier studies can be addressed by 
including sufficient control variables and by taking the discussion beyond the presence or 
absence of democracy to the quality and maturity of democracy and the technical and 
administrative capacity of the governments. The presence of democracy alone may not 
guarantee greater human development unless it is accompanied by strong democratic 
values and culture that includes civil and political liberties; a vibrant civil society that raises 
its voice effectively to get justice for the poor; a vocal and independent media that acts as a 
watch dog; effective mechanisms to hold governments accountable to the people such as an 
independent judiciary; and an electoral system that guarantees free and fair elections. 
 2.2.2 Corruption and human development 
Corruption, broadly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, is found to have 
a negative impact on human development through several ways. It reduces economic 
growth and the pace of poverty reduction. It increases military expenditures (see e.g. Gupta, 
and Sharan et. al., 2001) and has a negative impact on resources allocated for health and 
education (Mauro, 1998). It leads to leakages in public resources, including those that are 
allocated for health and education, and leads to an inefficient and inequitable allocation of 
these resources. Corruption is also found to be the primary factor behind low quality of 
education and health services. Cross country empirical studies have found that corruption 
has a negative impact on health and education indicators as measured by child mortality 
and immunization coverage on the one hand and literacy rate, school enrolment and drop-
out rates on the other hand.  Gupta and Davoodi et.al. (2000) for instance, conducted a cross 
section analysis of 128 countries for the period 1985-97 and found that corruption has 
adverse consequences on child mortality, percentage of low birth babies and drop outs in 
primary schools. In particular, the study found that child mortality rates in countries with 
high corruption are about one third higher than countries with low corruption. Infant 
mortality and percentage of low birth weight babies are twice as high; whereas drop-out 
rates are five times as high. Corruption is also found to be a contributing factor in fostering 
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educational, income and asset inequality (see e.g. Gupta and Davoodi  et al., 1998) thereby 
exacerbating poverty. 
Similarly, Akcay (2006) employed three different indices of corruption (Corruption 
Perception Index by Transparency International; International Country Risk Guide by 
Political Risk Services; and Corruption Index compiled by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003)), conducted a cross country analysis of 63 countries and found a statistically 
significant negative relationship between corruption and human development. Corruption 
is inevitably a symptom of poor political and economic institution. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) suggest that government institutions and political process are a very important 
determinant of the level of corruption. 
2.2.3 Good governance and human development 
Studies on the role of good governance in human development have mostly examined 
the role of good governance in translating public expenditures on health and education in 
an efficient and equitable manner. Empirical studies have found a weak relationship 
between public expenditures and health outcomes implying that the governments on 
average are not efficient in terms of translating public expenditures into effective services 
(see e.g  Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Filmer et al. 2000; Kim and Moody 1992; Musgrove 1996; 
Pritchett and Summers 1996). These studies further reinforce the argument that it is not 
merely fiscal outlays for health and education but the efficient, equitable and transparent 
utilization of these resources that matter for improvement in human development 
outcomes. 
 
3. Sample and Variables  
We conduct estimations for both the Human Development Index (HDI) as well as its non 
income components: the life expectancy and the combined gross enrolment rates. We do not 
use adult literacy rate as the available data on this variable is not adequate and after the 
inclusion of all control variables, our sample size is reduced further. We assume that the 
combined gross enrolment rate serves as a good proxy of educational attainment. For HDI 
as our dependent variable, our basic sample (sample A) consists of 72 countries, out of 
which 51 are developing countries. This sample is reduced further when we include data on 
income inequality. We include these two variables in a sub sample (sample B) that consists 
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of 58 countries, out of which 38 are developing countries. We report results for both these 
samples. For life expectancy as our dependent variable, the sample consists of 78 countries, 
out of which 57 are developing countries. For combined gross enrolment rates, we have a 
sample size of 66 countries, out of which 48 are developing countries.  
Our dependent variable is the Human Development Index (2005) labeled as hdi reported 
in the Global Human Development Report prepared by UNDP (UNDP, 2009). This 2005 
index is averaged over the five year period from 2000 to 2005 using a consistent 
methodology. We also report results on two other models in which we are interested in 
examining the determinants of non income components of the Human Development Index. 
The dependent variables in these models are the Life Expectancy (lie) and the Combined 
Gross Enrolment Ratios (ger), both taken from UNDP (2009). 
In terms of potential explanatory variables, we first focus on variables that are either 
predetermined or exogenous or those that evolve slowly over time. To start with, we first 
estimate the impact of some key variables related to geography and climate. We also include 
some regional dummies in our initial set of estimations. To capture the role of geography, 
we make use of a well-known ecozone classification systems of the tropics, namely the 
Koeppen-Geiger (KG) zones. The variable of our interest is the share of a country‟s 
population that lives in a Koeppen-Geiger temperate zone (kgptemp). This classification 
defines climatic boundaries based on vegetation types, temperature, and precipitation.  
Other researchers have also used zero one dummy for tropical location as well as variables 
that measure latitude and longitude. However, as pointed out by Sach‟s (2000), tropical or 
temperate ecozones are a rough characterization of a country‟s relevant ecological 
characteristics and a more useful definition of tropics should be based on ecological and 
climatic characteristics rather than the geographical characteristics. In this sense kgptemp is a 
superior measure as it classifies countries on the basis of both temperature as well as 
precipitation. We also use mean temperature (meantemp) as an additional measure of 
climate. 
To measure disease ecology, we utilize the Malaria Ecology Index (me) – a 
comprehensive index constructed by Kiszewski and Sachs et al. (2004) that measures the 
intensity of malaria transmission based upon the biological characteristics of mosquitoes 
and the ecological conditions.  
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To access the role of colonial legacy, we use a number of measures that include colonial 
dummy on whether or not a country had ever been colonized (colever); the fraction of people 
speaking any of the major European languages (eurfrac). We also use the dummy for 
colonizer‟s identity. Since majority of the countries that were colonized in the past were 
either French or British colonies, we use legbritish (a dummy for whether or not a country 
was a British colony) and legfrench (a dummy for whether or not a country was a French 
colony).   
We also make use of some well known and widely used measures of good governance 
and political institutions. To access the role of governance, we use a broad index of the 
quality of governance constructed by Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi (2005). The index is 
formed by averaging across six measures of 1) Voice and Accountability (measuring 
political and civil rights); 2) Political stability and the Absence of Violence; 3) Government 
Effectiveness (measuring the competence of bureaucracy and the quality of bureaucracy); 4) 
Regulatory Burden (measuring the incidence of market unfriendly policies); 5) Rule of Law 
and 6) Control of Corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2005). This index is referred to as the KKZ 
index (avgkkz).  A higher value of the index corresponds to high quality governance. For 
political institutions, we make use of the dataset compiled by Polity IV Project of the Center 
for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. We 
use the Polity2 (polity2) score from this dataset that ranges from 10 (highly democratic) to -
10 (highly autocratic). We also experiment with some other structural parameters that 
includes the measure of ethnic fractionalization (ethnifrac) and obtained from Alesina et al. 
(2003). The index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a 
population belonged to different ethnic groups. Its theoretical maximum is reached at the 
value of one when each person belongs to a different group. Empirical studies have shown 
that ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is associated with inferior government 
performance. La Porte (1999) for instance finds that government performance, measured by 
a variety of variables including the quality of public goods such as health, education and 
infrastructure, is relatively poor in ethno-linguistic heterogeneous societies. The central 
theoretical argument is that in more ethnically heterogeneous societies, the ruling group has 
a tendency to limit the provision of public goods and restrict the other minority groups to 
benefit and get powerful. They also tend to restrict the freedom of opposition. Easterly and 
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Levine (2009) attribute much of the Africa‟s growth tragedy – reflected in negative growth, 
poor schooling, political instability, under developed financial systems and  high 
government revenues – to Africa‟s high level of ethnic fragmentation. Easterly and Levine 
argue that a large part of differences in public policies, political instability and other factors 
associated with long term economic growth  can be explained by cross country differences 
in ethnic diversity.  
Other variables include the growth rate of Real GDP per capita in $PPP (pengryc) for 
2005 obtained from Penn World tables. Since the level of GDP per capita is included in HDI 
by construction, we do not use it.  To measure income inequality, we make use of the much 
superior data set on income inequality recently made available by Easterly (2005) in which 
data is adjusted by taking the average of each country of estimates from all sources over the 
period 1960-1998 (giniadj). This reduces the measurement error associated with income 
inequality data and serves as a good measure of initial inequality for the purposes of our 
study. We also use public spending on health as percentage of GDP (hlthexp) and public 
spending on education as percentage of GDP (eduexp) both obtained from World 
Development indicators by the World Bank. We take data lagged by five years on these two 
indicators so as to reduce the problem of reverse causality and to allow for the time lag 
required to translate public health and education expenditures into outcomes. Other 
conditioning variables that we use are immunization rates against DPT (imdpt); the number 
of physicians per 1,000 population (physc), fertility rate (frtrt); the incidence of Tuberculoses 
per 100,000 population (intub) and the urbanization rate that is simply the growth rate of 
urban population (urbnpopg) all obtained from the World Bank data source. 
  
4. Some Estimation Preliminaries 
The scatter plots presented in Appendix 1 show some clear patterns emerging from the 
data. Among the variables related to geography and climate, malaria ecology and mean 
temperature seem to have a clear negative association with the Human Development Index 
(HDI). In particular, the slope of the fitted line between malaria ecology and human 
development is visibly steep. Interestingly, the association between human development 
and all components of good governance is clearly positive. Growth rate of real GDP per 
capita seems to have a very weak association with the HDI. Among other variables, fertility 
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rate and urbanization rate seem to be closely and negatively related to HDI. Policy 
variables such as public spending on health and health infrastructure, such as the number 
of physicians and immunization rates, are positively associated with HDI variables as 
expected. With regards to the Gini coefficient of income inequality, there is a negative 
pattern of association between the measures of inequality and human development 
emerging from the scatter plots. However, the scatter points do not seem to be tightly 
clustered across the fitted line and so the relationship appears to be rather weak. A negative 
association is also visible between HDI and ethnic fractionalization. 
 
5. The Econometric Methodology 
In order to test the relevance of a host of competing variables in explaining 
human development across countries, we will employ a novel econometric technique 
called the   Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) or Bayesian Averaging of Classical 
Estimates (BACE). The reason for choosing Bayesian methods is that empirical research 
on human development, particularly in a cross country perspective is negligible. There 
are many candidate predictors, and theory provides only weak guidance on the 
specification of the regression. In other words, there is uncertainty regarding the choice 
of an appropriate model. Model uncertainty is a fundamental problem for empirical 
research in social science and the traditional response to this problem is to downplay it, 
select a set of suitable predictors and a single model and then base inferences on the 
basis of this model. The drawback of this approach is that it ignores model uncertainty. 
Ignoring model uncertainty lead to the impairment of predictive performance of the 
model and leads to overstatement of the strength of evidence via p-values that are too 
small (see Hoeting et al, 1999). The Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) gets 
around with this problem by constructing estimates as weighted average of OLS 
estimates for every possible combination of included variables. For instance, if we 
restrict ourselves to linear regression models with explanatory variables drawn from a 
set of p predictors, where p is less than the number of countries, then there are 2P 
possible models that can be estimated including the null model with only an intercept. 
The Bayesian methods estimate every possible model with different combination of 
predictors and then report the posterior probability of inclusion of different explanatory 
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variables in order of their importance. A higher inclusion probability of a variable 
indicates the higher importance of that variable in explaining the dependent variable. 
For instance, if Θ is the model parameter, then the posterior distribution of Θ is given 
by: 
 
 𝑝 Θ Ζ =  𝑝 Θ Ζ,Μk 𝑝 Μk Ζ ,
Κ
k=1  
 
Where M= (M1, M2, …., Mk) is the set of models under consideration and Z is the given 
data. The estimation of posterior distribution is based upon the Bayesian Information 
Criteron (BIC). In order to investigate the hypothesis that a slope coefficient βz ≠0, we 
sum up the posterior model probabilities for all models in which βz ≠0. Similarly, we 
can also assess the weight of evidence that a coefficient is strictly positive by summing 
up the posterior model probabilities for all models in which βz>0. 
The advantage of using Bayesian methods is that it guides us in the selection of 
predictors and the appropriate model. It allows us to include and try an exhaustive set 
of predictors, a luxury that the Ordinary Least Squares does not allow as it runs into the 
risk of losing the precision of the model (through the reduction in the degree of 
freedom). It also allows us to examine robustness of variables across a wide range of 
specifications. Recent advances in computing power have made a Bayesian approach 
increasingly easy to adopt. Our study is the first to apply these methods to the 
examination of factors affecting human development across countries. 
 
6. Estimation Results  
6.1 Results from the Bayesian Approach 
As mentioned in section 3 above, we have four different samples: The first two samples 
(one with income inequality and the other without) are used to examine factors that the 
affect the Human Development Index (HDI) across countries. The dependent variable in 
this specification is therefore the HDI. The other two samples are obtained to repeat the 
estimations to examine the determinants of non income components of HDI: the life 
expectancy and the combined gross enrolment rates. Using the methods describe in 
section 5, we compute posterior probabilities of inclusion of a variable, namely the sum 
of posterior model probabilities for all models in which a variable appears. We also 
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provide some indication of the sign of a relationship, based on the total posterior 
probability for models in which a variable acts in a given direction. 
The estimation results are reported in Appendix 4. We start off with some fixed 
or exogenous factors such as the geographic location, climate, disease ecology and 
colonial history. These results are reported in column 1 of each table. In the next column, 
we include the remaining variables such as some direct measures of institutions 
(Governance Index; and democracy score from Polity2); policy variables (such as public 
spending on health and education; and health infrastructure); and other conditioning 
variables (such as growth of GDP per capita; initial income inequality; fertility rates and 
growth of urban population etc.)  
Let us first examine the results for HDI.  Starting off with some fixed factors such 
as regional location, percentage of population living in temperate zones, mean 
temperature, and malaria ecology, we find that percentage of population living in 
temperate zones (kgptemp) receives a very high posterior inclusion probability of 0.94. 
The positive sign indicates that HDI is higher on average for population living in 
temperate regions. Among the regional dummies, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asian 
dummy receive the highest posterior inclusion probabilities of 1.0. The negative sign 
indicates unsurprisingly that HDI is poorer for people living in South Asia and Sub 
Saharan Africa. Western Europe has posterior inclusion probabilities of 0.83 with a 
positive sign. British colony also receives a very high posterior inclusion probability of 
0.90 percent. The sign is positive indicating that HDI is positively associated with 
countries that have been British colonies in the past. Malaria ecology receives the 
posterior inclusion probability of 0.26 with a negative predicted sign indicating the HDI 
is negatively associated with malaria prone regions.  
In the next column, when we add some direct measures of institution such as the 
KKZ Governance Index, Polity2 and other conditioning variables, interestingly, we find 
that the importance of climate and colonial legacy variables drops drastically with none 
of these variables receiving more than 0.14 of posterior inclusion probability. This 
indicates that geography, climate and colonial legacy affect HDI only though institutions 
and not directly. The most important variables, in order of their posterior inclusion 
probability turn out to be fertility rate (1.0), South Asia dummy (1.0) developing 
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countries dummy (1.0), malaria ecology (0.98), KKZ index of good governance (0.77) and 
Sub Saharan Africa dummy (0.68).  
Of particular interest is the high posterior inclusion probability (with a negative 
predicted sign) of malaria ecology. This is despite the fact that we controlled for both 
direct as well as indirect measures of the quality of institutions. This vindicates Sach‟s 
(2003) contention that malaria has a direct role in development as opposed to Acemoglu 
and Johnson et al. (2003) who contend that malaria affects development only through 
institutions and not directly. Nevertheless, our variable of interest is the human 
development and not economic development per say as in Acemoglu and Johnson et al. 
(2003). This result is quite fascinating because the importance of malaria ecology does 
not decline (in fact increase further) in all our samples even when we use gross 
enrolment rates and life expectancy as the dependent variables. It does not receive the 
posterior inclusion probability of less than 0.98 in all the samples and in the presence of 
all controls.  
The results do not change much with the inclusion of initial income inequality 
except for the fact that in addition to KKZ index of good governance, Polity2 also 
receives a high posterior inclusion probability of 0.78 in this sample. The predicted sign 
is positive indicating that democracy score is positively associated with human 
development across countries. Fertility rate and malaria ecology both receive posterior 
inclusion probabilities of 1.0. Initial income inequality receives posterior inclusion 
probability of 0.12 and the predicted sign turns out to be indeterminate. 
Next, let us examine the results for our life expectancy equation (table 4.3). We 
have slightly modified the equation by dropping some irrelevant explanatory variables 
such as public spending on education and including other relevant variables such as the 
incidence of disease such as the Tuberculosis. Moreover, we also control for the level of 
real GDP per capita. According to the estimation results, the most important variables in 
degree of their posterior inclusion probabilities are the disease prevalence as proxied by 
the incidence of Tuberculosis (1.0), fertility rate (1.0), real GDP per capita (1.0), malaria 
ecology (1.0), East Asia and Pacific (0.94), French colony (0.98), and Sub Saharan Africa 
(0.97). Interestingly, the predicted sign for French colony turns out to be positive 
implying that countries that have been French colonies in the past seem to have higher 
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life expectancies on average. The other variables have predicted signs as expected.  The 
KKZ index of good governance however loses its importance in the presence of real 
GDP per capita.  
When we take gross enrolment ratio as our dependent variable, we include 
undernourishment rate and real GDP per capita as our additional controls. We drop 
public spending on health. The results, reported in table 4.4, are similar in many ways to 
the ones we obtained above. Malaria ecology again receives one of the highest posterior 
inclusion probability of 1.0. The other important variables, in degree of their posterior 
inclusion probability, are percentage of population living in temperate regions (0.99) 
democracy score as measured by Polity2 (0.98) East Asia and Pacific (0.95), Latin 
America and Caribbean (0.95); real GDP per capita (0.93); immunization against DPT 
(0.93); and public spending on education as % of GDP (0.36).   The predicted signs for all 
these variables are as expected. Notice that when we control for GDP per capita, the 
importance of KKZ index of governance disappears. The results for gross enrolment 
ratios turn out to be a little different from the HDI and the life expectancy specifications 
in the sense that temperate location now receives a high inclusion probability, even in 
the presence of all controls, and the predicted sign is positive implying that gross 
enrolment rates are on average higher in temperate locations. Immunization rate also 
receives a reasonably high inclusion probability and the predicted sign is positive. 
Public spending on education also seems to matter a lot with higher spending associated 
with higher gross enrolment rates. 
 
 6.2 OLS Results 
Bayesian methods are useful in terms of providing guidance in the selection of variables 
that have a high predictive power across an exhaustive set of model specifications. 
However, it does not help us predict the size of the impact of independent variables on 
dependent variables. In order to get some insight on the significance and size of the 
impact of independent variables on dependent variable, we conduct OLS estimations.  
The selection of the variables is based upon the posterior inclusion probabilities that 
they received in BMA results described in section 6.1. We select only those variables for 
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our OLS estimations that receive a relatively high posterior inclusion probability (greater 
than 0.2). 
As in the case of BMA, we use four different samples (two for HDI as the dependent 
variable, one for life expectancy and one for gross enrolment ratio as the dependent 
variable. Before we present the OLS results, it is important to mention some caveats. 
First, since model selection is involved, therefore there might be a selection bias in the 
coefficient estimates. Moreover, since many of our explanatory variables are closely 
related to each other, it may not be straight forward to disentangle the effect of one 
variable from another. For instance, the KKZ index of good governance is highly 
correlated with real GDP per capita (partial correlation coefficient turns out to be 0.88). 
So in specifications where we cannot use GDP per capita as the explanatory variable 
(such as in the HDI equation), KKZ index may very well be picking up the role of 
income.  For this purpose, the OLS results need to be interpreted with caution. 
Table 4.3-4.5 present the OLS results across different specifications. As we can see 
clearly, the OLS results broadly support the insights we gained from our BMA 
estimations. The coefficient of malaria ecology is highly significant across all the 
specifications even after controlling for regional dummies, geography variable 
(percentage of population living in temperate zones) as well as governance and policy 
variables. The predicted sign is negative indicating that countries that have a high value 
of Malaria Ecology Index (countries that are more prone to malaria) have low human 
development. Notice that the size of the impact of malaria ecology (as depicted by the 
value of the coefficient estimate) is relatively small for HDI as compared to life 
expectancy and gross enrolment ratios. A one percent increase in Malaria Ecology Index 
for instance would lead to a reduction in HDI index by 0.03 percent on average, whereas 
the same increase in Malaria Ecology index would lead to a 1.3 percent reduction in life 
expectancy and 3.5 percent reduction in gross enrolment ratios. The coefficient of 
governance index is also significant and positive in majority of the specifications. 
However, once we control for the level of real GDP per capita, its impact dies out and 
the coefficient estimate is no longer significant. Fertility rate has a negative and a highly 
significant impact on both Human Development Index as well as life expectancy. It loses 
its statistical significance however in explaining gross enrolment ratios. It is interesting 
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to note that democracy score (Polity2) is highly significant in explaining gross enrolment 
ratios. The sign is positive implying that higher democracy is good for improving 
education across countries. Notice that real GDP per capita does not have a statistically 
significant impact on gross enrolment ratios whereas immunization rates have a positive 
and a statistically significant impact on gross enrolment ratios. As in BMA results, 
percentage of population living in KG temperate zones has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on gross enrolment ratios even after controlling for the level of GDP 
per capita and governance.           
 
7. Conclusion 
In recent years, a number of interesting studies have been conducted to 
investigate the impact of long standing institutions – identified through geography, 
disease ecology and colonial legacy - on economic growth or the level of GDP per capita. 
However, no such empirical study is conducted to investigate the impact of these 
institutions on a broader and a much more relevant indicator of human wellbeing such 
as the human development. This study aims to fill this critical gap by investigating the 
role of geography, institutions and disease ecology on human development and its non 
income components across countries. The study employs a comprehensive set of 
variables on geography, climate, disease ecology and some direct measures of political 
and economic institutions and uses a novel econometric technique called the Bayesian 
Model Averaging to study the role of each of these variables in affecting human 
development across countries. This econometric approach constructs estimates as 
weighted average of OLS estimates for every possible combination of included variables. 
Based upon this method, it computes posterior probabilities of inclusion, namely the 
sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which a variable appears.  A 
higher posterior inclusion probability of a variable indicates the higher degree of 
importance of that variable in explaining the dependent variable. The method also 
provides some indication of the sign of a relationship, based on the total posterior 
probability for models in which a variable acts in a given direction. The advantage of 
using this approach is that it takes into account model uncertainty particularly when 
theory provides only weak guidance on the selection of relevant variables. It also allows 
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us to include and try an exhaustive set of predictors, a luxury that a straight forward 
estimation of Ordinary Least Squares does not provide without running into the risk of 
losing the precision of the estimates. 
We used three different specifications, each including a different measure of 
human development as the dependent variable. More specifically, we used the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and its non income components of life expectancy and 
combined gross enrolment rates as the dependent variable in each of these 
specifications. Out of an average of 25 variables that we tried for each equation, three 
variables stand out in terms of their importance and robustness in explaining both 
human development as well as its non-income components across countries. These 
include malaria ecology, KKZ index of good governance and fertility rate. Malaria 
ecology receives one of the highest posterior inclusion probabilities and this is true 
across all specifications of human development and in the presence of all controls 
including some direct as well as indirect measures of the quality of institutions. This 
indicates that malaria ecology has a direct negative impact on human development and 
this effect is over and above its effect on the quality of institutions. This turns out to be 
one of the most fascinating findings of our study. 
Other geographic and climatic variables, particularly the percentage of 
population living in KG temperate zone are important as long as we do not control for 
some direct measures of the quality of institutions such as the KKZ index of good 
governance and democracy score; policy variables such the public spending on health 
and education; and other conditioning variables such as the fertility rate, immunization 
coverage and growth in urbanization etc. As soon as we control for these variables, the 
importance of geography and climate disappears. Same is true for colonial legacy. 
British and French legacy as well as fraction of population speaking any of the European 
languages turn out to be important initially. However once we control for the direct 
measures of the performance of economic and political institutions, colonial legacy does 
not matter anymore. 
  The KKZ index of good governance is positively associated with the human 
development. This index measures various aspects of the performance of political and 
economic institutions. It is the average of six indices namely :1) Voice and 
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Accountability (measuring political and civil rights); 2) Political stability and the 
Absence of Violence; 3) Government Effectiveness (measuring the competence of 
bureaucracy and the quality of bureaucracy); 4) Regulatory Burden (measuring the 
incidence of market unfriendly policies); 5) Rule of Law and 6) Control of Corruption. 
The significance of these measures of political and economic governance has been 
pointed out earlier in some studies, particularly in a number of global, regional and 
national Human Development Reports prepared by the UNDP, yet to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that points to the direct empirical relationship between 
human development and good governance. The importance of KKZ index of good 
governance is however not robust to the inclusion of real GDP per capita. This implies 
that good governance index may very well be capturing the role of real GDP per capita 
in explaining life expectancy and gross enrolment ratios across countries.  The finding 
that fertility rate is closely and negatively associated with the human development 
across countries is also an extremely useful finding from a policy perspective. 
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Appendix 1: Scatter Plots 
Figure 1 
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Figure 12 
 
 
 
Figure 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
-10 0 10 20 30
Growth of Real GDP Per Capita
HDI Fitted values
Growth of Real GDP Per Capita and Human Development
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
20 30 40 50 60 70
Gini Coefficient
HDI Fitted values
Income Inequality and Human Development
37 
 
Figure 14 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
 
 
 
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Log of Wheat Sugar Ratio
HDI Fitted values
Wheat Sugar Ratio and Human Development
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
0 2 4 6 8
Public Spending on Health as % of GDP
HDI Fitted values
Public Health Expenditure and Human Development
38 
 
Figure 16 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
 
 
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
2 4 6 8 10 12
Public Spending on Education as % of GDP
HDI Fitted values
Public Spending on Education and Human Development
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
0 20 40 60 80 100
Rural Population as %of Total
HDI Fitted values
% of Rural Population and Human Development
39 
 
Figure 18 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 
 
 
 
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
0 5 10
Urban Population Growth rate
HDI Fitted values
Urbanization and Human Development
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
0 2 4 6 8
Fertility rate
HDI Fitted values
Fertility Rate and Human Development
40 
 
Figure 20 
 
 
 
Figure 21 
 
 
 
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
-2 0 2 4 6
Population Growth Rate
HDI Fitted values
Population Growth and Human Development
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
20 40 60 80 100
Immunization Rate against Measles- Children 12-23 months
HDI Fitted values
Immunization Coverage and Human Development
41 
 
Figure 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
.4
.6
.8
1
1
.2
H
u
m
a
n
 D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
In
d
e
x
0 2 4 6
Physicians per 1000 people
HDI Fitted values
No. of physicians and Human Development
42 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 
Variable Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
hdi 169 0.73 0.18 0.33 0.968 
kgptemp 104 0.30 0.42 0 1 
meantemp 101 19.94 7.73 -0.2 29.3 
lwheatsugar 112 0.11 0.21 -0.39 0.58 
eurfrac 101 0.25 0.40 0 1.004 
colever 104 0.44 0.50 0 1 
legbritish 162 0.35 0.48 0 1 
legfrench 160 0.44 0.50 0 1 
me 102 4.67 7.63 0 31.5479 
avgkkz 157 -0.06 0.90 -1.77 1.94 
polity2 147 3.91 6.42 -10 10 
pengryc 169 2.90 3.50 -4.98 22.74 
giniadj 119 42.27 9.01 23.97 67.46 
ethnifrac 166 0.44 0.26 0 0.9302 
hlthexp 167 3.34 1.82 0.09 8.21 
eduexp 141 4.44 1.80 1.23 11.67 
imdpt 168 84.62 15.91 21.8 99 
physc 146 1.52 1.40 0.0155 5.91 
urbnpopg 169 2.19 1.75 -1.26 9.14 
fertrt 161 3.05 1.64 0.97 7.67 
intub 169 141.31 1050.66 2.94 1050.66 
ger 168 72 17.70 25.5 114.2 
lie 164 68 10.34 44.5 82.7 
 
 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of key variables by level of human development 
  LOW MEDIUM HIGH VERY HIGH 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
kgptemp 19 0.00 42 0.10 19 0.36 24 0.84 
Mean  17 25.94 41 22.86 19 11.28 24 11.29 
me 19 15.39 41 4.31 18 0.35 24 0.02 
avgkkz 22 -0.85 69 -0.48 34 0.05 32 1.28 
polity2 22 1.77 62 2.10 34 5.12 29 8.00 
ethnifrac 22 0.72 68 0.47 41 0.39 35 0.26 
pengryc 22 2.03 71 3.31 41 3.36 35 2.07 
hlthexp 22 1.91 71 2.56 40 3.75 34 5.40 
eduexp 19 3.33 57 4.38 34 4.54 31 5.12 
urbnpopg 22 4.41 71 2.57 41 1.13 35 1.28 
imdpt 22 65.73 71 80.68 41 93.90 34 93.89 
physc 22 0.07 61 0.90 30 2.42 33 2.84 
fertrt 22 5.78 68 3.42 37 1.97 34 1.72 
giniadjnoc 14 46.76 48 45.04 29 41.63 28 35.95 
lwheatsugar 14 0.01 48 -0.01 25 0.20 25 0.29 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrices  
 
  
Table 3.1: Geography and Human Development Index (n = 99) 
  
  hdi meantemp kgptemp Me 
          
hdi 1       
meantemp -0.655 1     
kgptemp 0.703 -0.832 1   
me -0.769 0.502 -0.460 1 
 
Table 3.2: Regional Dummies and Human Development Index (n=169) 
  hdi regeap regmena regsa regwe Regssa reglac 
hdi 1             
regeap 0.088 1           
regmena 0.126 -0.126 1         
regsa -0.133 -0.078 -0.070 1       
regwe 0.425 -0.126 -0.112 -0.070 1     
regssa -0.762 -0.230 -0.205 -0.127 -0.205 1   
reglac 0.176 -0.175 -0.155 -0.097 -0.155 -0.284 1 
 
Table 3.3: Colonial Legacy and Human Development (n=101) 
  hdi colever eurfrac legbritish legfrench 
            
hdi 1         
colever -0.617 1       
eurfrac 0.498 -0.533 1     
legbritish -0.076 0.189 -0.059 1   
legfrench -0.202 0.078 0.117 -0.711 1 
 
Table 3.4: Governance, Political Institutions and Human Development (n=142)  
  hdi avgkkz va ps Ge rq Rl coc polity2 ethnifrac 
                      
hdi 1                   
avgkkz 0.748 1                 
va 0.652 0.911 1               
ps 0.553 0.832 0.720 1             
ge 0.772 0.979 0.873 0.759 1           
rq 0.759 0.959 0.887 0.721 0.953 1         
rl 0.737 0.975 0.831 0.784 0.964 0.921 1       
coc 0.708 0.958 0.814 0.749 0.948 0.892 0.965 1     
polity2 0.340 0.508 0.754 0.386 0.466 0.511 0.387 0.379 1   
ethnifrac -0.571 -0.481 -0.447 -0.407 -0.47 -0.45 -0.475 -0.446 -0.282 1 
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Table 3.5: Human Development and Other Conditioning Variables  
  hdi pengryc hlthexp eduexp fertrt urbnpopg imdpt physc 
                  
hdi 1               
pengryc 0.03 1             
hlthexp 0.64 -0.15 1           
eduexp 0.27 -0.25 0.51 1         
fertrt -0.86 -0.10 -0.52 -0.24 1       
urbnpopg -0.67 -0.18 -0.43 -0.19 0.76 1     
imdpt 0.65 -0.03 0.44 0.29 -0.70 -0.47 1   
physc 0.77 0.19 0.56 0.20 -0.77 -0.72 0.578 1 
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Appendix 4: BMA Results 
 
Table 4.1:  
Dependent Variable HDI 
Sample A (Without income inequality N=72) 
 
Variable 
Posterior inclusion 
probabilities Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities 
 
 
Sign 
Intercept 1.00 "+" 1.00 "+" 
% of population living in KG 
Temperate Zone 0.94 "+" 0.14 "?" 
Mean Temperature 0.22 "-" 0.01 "?" 
Malaria Ecology 0.26 "-" 0.98 "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa 1.00 "-" 0.68 "-" 
South Asia 1.00 "-" 1.00 "-" 
East Asia and Pacific 0.04 "?" 0.02 "?" 
Latin America and Caribbean 0.04 "?" 0.19 "?" 
Western Europe 0.83 "+" 0.01 "?" 
Middle East and North Africa  0.06 "?" 0.01 "?" 
Colony 0.16 "?" 0.05 "?" 
British Colony 0.90 "+" 0.06 "?" 
French Colony 0.09 "?" 0 "?" 
Fraction of people speaking 
any European language 0.17 "?" 0 "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 
  
0.77 "+" 
Polity 2 
  
0.00 "?" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
  
0.06 "?" 
Developing Country  
  
1.00 "-" 
Public Expenditure on health 
(% of GDP) 
  
0.05 "?" 
Public Expenditure on 
education  (% of GDP) 
  
0.07 "?" 
Immunization against DPT 
  
0.04 "?" 
Fertility rate 
  
1.00 "-" 
Urbanization rate 
  
0.25 "-" 
Physicians 
  
0.17 "?" 
 
The dependent variable is hdi, the Human Development Index (2005). High values correspond to higher 
levels of Human Development. The numbers reported in the table are the posterior inclusion probabilities 
for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which the variable is 
included). We also report an indicator of the direction of the relationship. (?) indicates an indeterminate 
sign.  
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Table 4.2:  
Dependent Variable HDI (Sample B: with income inequality N=58) 
 
Variable 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities 
 
 
Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities 
 
 
Sign 
Intercept 1.00 "+" 1.00 "+" 
% of population living in KG 
Temperate Zone 1.00 "+" 0.02 "?" 
Mean Temperature 0.06 "?" 0.09 "?" 
Malaria Ecology 0.84 "-" 1.00 "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa 1.00 "-" 1.00 "-" 
South Asia 1.00 "-" 1.00 "-" 
East Asia and Pacific 0.10 "?" 0.26 "+" 
Latin America and Caribbean 0.10 "?" 0.02 "?" 
Western Europe 0.99 "+" 0.07 "?" 
Middle East and North Africa  0.11 "?" 0.01 "?" 
Colony 0.06 "?" 0.01 "?" 
British Colony 0.90 "+" 0.23 "+" 
French Colony 0.10 "?" 0.12 "?" 
Fraction of people speaking 
any European language 0.30 "+" 0 "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 
  
0.90 "+" 
Polity 2 
  
0.78 "+" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
  
0.00 "?" 
Developing Country  
  
1.00 "-" 
Public Expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
  
0.06 "?" 
Public Expenditure on health  
(% of GDP) 
  
0.06 "?" 
Immunization against DPT 
  
0.99 "+" 
Fertility rate 
  
0.95 "-" 
Urbanization rate 
  
0.59 "-" 
Physicians 
  
0.04 "?" 
Gini (adjusted and averaged 
over 1960-98) 
  
0.12 "?" 
 
 
The dependent variable is hdi, the Human Development Index (2005). High values correspond to higher 
levels of Human Development. The numbers reported in the table are the posterior inclusion probabilities 
for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models in which the variable is 
included). We also report an indicator of the direction of the relationship. (?) indicates an indeterminate 
sign.  
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Table 4.2:  
Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy (Years) 
N = 78   
Variable 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities 
 
 
Sign 
Intercept 1.00 "+" 1.00 "+" 1.00 "+" 
% of population living in 
KG Temperate Zone 1.00 "+" 0 "?" 0.06 "?" 
Mean Temperature 0.08 "?" 0.01 "?" 0.07 "?" 
Malaria Ecology 0.73 "-" 0.97 "-" 1.00 "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa 1.00 "-" 0.95 "-" 0.97 "-" 
South Asia 0.26 "-" 0.06 "?" 0.07 "?" 
East Asia and Pacific 0.11 "?" 0.59 "+" 0.94 "+" 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 0.06 "?" 0.03 "?" 0.37 "+" 
Western Europe 0.51 "+" 0.12 "?" 0.02 "?" 
Middle East and North 
Africa  0.07 "?" 0 "?" 0.05 "?" 
Colony 0.05 "?" 0.02 "?" 0.05 "?" 
British Colony 0.06 "?" 0.04 "?" 0.02 "?" 
French Colony 0.06 "?" 0.73 "+" 0.98 "+" 
Fraction of people 
speaking any European 
language 1.00 "+" 0.07 "?" 0.06 "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ 
avg) 
  
0.96 "+" 0 "?" 
Polity 2 
  
0.01 "?" 0.02 "?" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
  
0.01 "?" 0.06 "?" 
Public Expenditure on 
health (% of GDP) 
  
0.10 "?" 0.00 "?" 
Incidence of Tuberculosis 
  
1.00 "-" 1.00 "-" 
Immunization against 
DPT 
  
0.09 "?" 0.97 "+" 
Fertility rate 
  
1.00 "-" 1.00 "-" 
Gross Enrolment Ratio 
  
0.48 "+" 0.06 "?" 
Gini (adjusted and 
averaged over 1960-98) 
  
0.02 "?" 0.11 "?" 
Real GDP per capita 
  
  1.00 "+" 
 
The dependent variable is lie, the Life Expectancy (2005). The numbers reported in the table are the 
posterior inclusion probabilities for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all models 
in which the variable is included). We also report an indicator of the direction of the relationship. (?) 
indicates an indeterminate relationship.  
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Table 4.2:  
Dependent Variable: Combined Gross Enrolment Ratios 
N = 66   
Variable 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities Sign 
Posterior 
inclusion 
probabilities 
 
 
Sign 
Intercept 1.00 "+" 1.00 "+" 1.00 "+" 
% of population living in KG 
Temperate Zone 1.00 "+" 0.97 "+" 0.99 "+" 
Mean Temperature 0.05 "?" 0.01 "?" 0 "?" 
Malaria Ecology 0.66 "-" 0.96 "-" 0.98 "-" 
Sub Saharan Africa 0.95 "-" 0.39 "-" 0.19 "?" 
South Asia 0.98 "-" 0.37 "-" 0.12 "?" 
East Asia and Pacific 0.15 "?" 0.68 "+" 0.95 "+" 
Latin America and Caribbean 0.51 "+" 0.66 "+" 0.95 "+" 
Western Europe 0.34 "+" 0.16 "?" 0.04 "?" 
Middle East and North Africa  0.09 "?" 0.06 "?" 0.13 "?" 
Colony 0.04 "?" 0 "?" 0 "?" 
British Colony 0.95 "+" 0.35 "+" 0.07 "?" 
French Colony 0.09 "?" 0.05 "?" 0.05 "?" 
Fraction of people speaking 
any European language 0.12 "?" 0.04 "?" 0.01 "?" 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 
  
0.75 "+" 0.08 "?" 
Polity 2 
  
0.93 "+" 0.98 "+" 
Ethnic fractionalization 
  
0.09 "?" 0.10 "?" 
Public Expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
  
0.47 "+" 0.36 "+" 
Immunization against DPT 
  
0.6 "+" 0.93 "+" 
Fertility rate 
  
0.16 "?" 0.30 "+" 
Gini (adjusted and averaged 
over 1960-98) 
  
0.00 "?" 0.01 "?" 
Undernourishment rate 
  
0 "?" 0 "?" 
GDP per capita 
  
  0.93 "+" 
 
The dependent variable is ger, the Gross Enrolment Ratios (2005). The numbers reported in the table are 
the posterior inclusion probabilities for each variable (the sum of posterior model probabilities for all 
models in which the variable is included). We also report an indicator of the direction of the relationship. 
(?) indicates an indeterminate sign. 
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Table 4.3: OLS Results 
Dependent Variable: HDI 
  Intercept 0.944*** 0.862*** 
  (-19.02) 15.29 
% of population living in KG Temperate Zone -0.062 -0.019 
  (-1.82) (-0.71) 
Malaria Ecology       -0.004***        -0.004*** 
  (-3.98) (-4.22) 
Sub Saharan Africa -0.058 -0.088 
  (-1.18) (-1.88) 
South Asia -0.125*** -0.118*** 
  (-4.64) (-3.84) 
Latin America and Caribbean 0.017 0.006 
  (0.79) (0.32) 
East Asia and Pacific 0.034 0.030 
  (1.86) (1.56) 
Western Europe 0.001 0.005 
  (0.05) (0.27) 
British Colony 0.037* 0.0309 
  (2.07) (1.61) 
French Colony 0.019 0.016 
  (1.36) (1.14) 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 0.043**          0.048*** 
  (2.51) (2.8) 
Polity 2 0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.91) (-0.41) 
Developing Country  -0.067** -0.047* 
  (-2.83) (-1.98) 
Fertility rate -0.042*** -0.036*** 
  (-3.64) (-2.65) 
Urbanization rate -0.015 -0.012 
  (-1.78) (-1.35) 
Physicians 0.027 0.018* 
 
(2.39) (2.02) 
Gini (adjusted and averaged over 1960-98) 
 
0.001 
  
(0.65) 
N 72 62 
Rsquared 0.9524 0.9624 
Numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics computed from 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
* p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001 
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Table 4.4: OLS Results 
Dependent variable: Life Expectancy 
Intercept 71.064*** 45.526*** 
  (16.62) (5.11) 
% of population living in KG Temperate Zone 0.607 0.177 
  (0.4) (0.13) 
Malaria Ecology -0.205** -0.223** 
  (-3.01) (-3.23) 
Sub Saharan Africa -3.160 -1.722 
  (-1.6) (-0.91) 
South Asia 1.094 2.403 
  (0.61) (1.85) 
Latin America and Caribbean 1.470 1.302 
  (1.27) (1.28) 
East Asia and Pacific 2.921* 3.057** 
  (2.41) (3.15) 
Western Europe 2.077* 1.364 
  (1.96) (1.49) 
British Colony 0.490 -0.343 
  (0.49) (-0.44) 
French Colony 1.864* 1.253 
  (2.15) (1.7) 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 1.470* 0.174 
  (2.12) (0.2) 
Fertility rate     -1.484*** -0.882* 
  (-3.65) (-2.28) 
Urbanization rate 0.158 0.209 
  (0.53) (0.8) 
Immunization rate against DPT 0.034 0.055* 
 
(1.31) (2.03) 
Incidence of Tuberculosis      -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 
(-4.67) (-4.34) 
Gross Enrolment Ratio 0.047             0.020 
 
(1.38) (0.65) 
Gini (adjusted and averaged over 1960-98) -0.046            -0.020 
 
(-0.89) (-0.45) 
Log of Real GDP per capita 
 
2.667** 
  
(2.97) 
N 78 78 
Rsquared 0.9631 0.971 
Numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics computed from 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
* p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001 
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Table 4.5: OLS Results 
Dependent variable: Gross Enrolment Ratios 
Intercept 21.938 
  (0.75) 
% of population living in KG Temperate Zone        16.769*** 
  (4.21) 
Malaria Ecology      -0.547*** 
  (-3.61) 
Sub Saharan Africa -10.456* 
  (-2.01) 
South Asia -7.622 
  (-1.14) 
Latin America and Caribbean 6.086 
  (1.72) 
East Asia and Pacific 8.125* 
  (2.26) 
Western Europe 3.703 
  (1.35) 
British Colony 5.331* 
  (2.02) 
French Colony 3.056 
  (1.35) 
Governance Index (KKZ avg) 1.885 
  (0.87) 
Polity 2          0.636*** 
  (4.7) 
Fertility rate 2.633 
  (1.72) 
Urbanization rate -0.144 
  (-0.15) 
Immunization rate against DPT      0.203** 
 
(2.86) 
Public Expenditure on education (% of GDP) 0.656 
 
(1.08) 
Undernourishment rate 0.048 
 
(0.41) 
Log of Real GDP per capita 1.577 
 
(0.58) 
N 66 
Rsquared 0.9177 
  Numbers reported in parentheses are t statistics computed from heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors 
* p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001 
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